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ABSTRACT In an age of rapid advances in technology, understanding how firms can 
respond to emergence of disruptive technologies is paramount for survival. While prior 
research on incumbents’ responses to disruptive technologies assumes demand homo-
geneity, many firms, including multinational enterprises (MNEs), need to respond to 
technological disruption in heterogeneous markets. To address this lacuna in our 
understanding, we study how Ericsson tried to respond to the emergence of Cloud 
computing, a digital platform technology, across its operations in more than 170 
countries. We reveal how incumbents need to match diverging customer demands with 
a complex innovation process, involving different approaches to experiments and trials, 
deployment strategy, and ecosystem development. We also find that the success of 
incumbents’ responses depends on their capability for misalignment, which allows 
them to manage the inconsistencies in strategic direction, structure, and resource 
configuration associated with a complex innovation process.
Keywords: heterogeneous markets, misalignment capability, multinational enterprises, 
strategic contradictions, technological disruption
INTRODUCTION
‘Sell your cleverness and buy bewilderment’. – Jalaluddin Rumi (1207–1273)
In an age of rapid technological advances, the survival of firms often rests on 
their ability to deal with disruption in the environment. As new technologies chal-
lenge existing industry logics, firms need to adopt new ways of doing business 
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to remain relevant. Mirroring this trend, there has also been a growth in recent 
years of management research on the challenges firms face during times of dis-
ruption (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) and on how firms can respond to disruption (Ansari and Krop, 
2012; Ansari et al., 2016; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Volberda et al., 2018).
The conventional line of thought holds that as major technological change has 
a fundamental effect on many aspects of organizations (Taylor and Helfat, 2009) 
and their business models (Markides, 2006; Markides and Oyon, 2010), a coordi-
nated adaptation that maintains strategic alignment between organizational assets 
and elements is recommended in order to achieve a sustainable competitive ad-
vantage (Birkinshaw et al., 2016; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015; Zajac et al., 2000). That 
is, drawing on contingency theory, existing research argues for the importance of 
internal fit, i.e., the alignment between internal aspects of the organization such 
as strategy, structure, and organizational activities (Peteraf and Reed, 2007).
However, despite the pervasiveness of this recommendation, many firms are 
unsuccessful in responding to disruption (Christensen et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz 
et al., 2015; King and Baatartogtokh, 2015; Uzunca, 2017) raising the question 
of the validity, feasibility, or boundaries of such an internal fit perspective. The 
universality of the strategic alignment perspective has recently been challenged 
by the idea that consistency can become less viable when firms face diverse contin-
gencies and conflicting requirements (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2015; Poulis 
and Poulis, 2016; Smith, 2014). In this opposing perspective, it is argued that or-
ganizations are able to thrive by embracing misalignment between internal com-
ponents (Gulati and Puranam, 2009) and promoting inconsistent mentalities and 
structures (Smith et al., 2016).
In an effort to understand how firms can cope with disruption in their indus-
tries, we study how Ericsson, a leading global provider of telecommunications 
infrastructure with operations in more than 170 countries, is attempting to re-
spond to technological disruption in its industry. The emergence of Cloud com-
puting and its underlying technologies is challenging Ericsson’s existing value 
logic by shifting value in the industry from the sale of hardware to the provision 
of Cloud-enabled services. This threatens Ericsson’s standing in the industry as 
its key capabilities are designing and selling telecommunication equipment. We 
study Ericsson’s adoption of a disruptive technology using an inductive approach 
involving analysis of chiefly qualitative data from multiple sources (i.e., internal 
documents and communications, 33 interviews with managers at different hierar-
chical levels, written comments from 170 relationship managers worldwide, and 
insights and observations from a five-year field study between 2010 and 2014).
We contribute to the discussion on how incumbents respond to technological 
disruption in several ways. First, our study contributes to disruption research by 
uncovering strategic tensions that arise from market heterogeneity when firms 
attempt to respond to industry disruption. We complement prior research that 
has generally considered incumbents’ responses to disruption in homogenous 
markets for the new technology (e.g., Gilbert, 2005; Taylor and Helfat, 2009). 
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The incorporation of demand-side heterogeneity in our study allows us to study 
the subsequent strains on an incumbent’s attempts to form a shared interpreta-
tion of the future. This is in line with the growing attention being given to multi-
sided markets and platform ecosystems by strategy and organization scholars who 
consider heterogeneity an important, yet less examined, factor that influences 
the strategic behaviour of suppliers (e.g., McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017; Rietveld 
and Eggers, 2018). Our findings highlight how firms facing high levels of market 
heterogeneity need to understand and accommodate the presence of tensions 
between different interpretations of the future in terms of the magnitude and 
speed of changes in the market.
Second, we add to the recent debates over whether internal alignment has a 
universal value as a lever for effective strategic change (Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2015; Poulis and Poulis, 2016; Smith et al., 2016). In particular, we propose 
market heterogeneity as a potential a boundary condition for whether focusing 
on internal fit may constitute an effective response to disruption. We therefore 
prepare the ground for discussing the organizational capabilities that allow an 
incumbent to appreciate, nurture, and deal with the tensions of misalignment – 
capabilities that could be argued to be crucial for the firm’s survival.
Third, we contribute to research on international business by providing 
grounded theory on how MNEs respond to disruption. We advance previous re-
search which acknowledges that MNEs often have to deal with a far greater num-
ber of contingencies and a higher degree of market heterogeneity compared to 
other organizations (Teece, 2014) in that we show how this type of complexity af-
fects MNEs’ responses to disruption. We also complement research on how MNEs 
can deal effectively with demand heterogeneity in relatively stable conditions by 
considering their need for responsiveness and efficiency (Ghoshal and Nohria, 
1989, 1993, Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994, 1997).
THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS
Organizational Alignment, Misalignment, and Strategic Change
The strategic management literature lays considerable stress on the importance 
of alignment and realignment between strategy, structure, people, and culture 
for the long-term survival and competitiveness of firms (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996). Fit between organizational elements is said to enhance performance be-
cause it provides employees with clear direction about appropriate actions and 
behaviour, it aligns different organizational elements so that they reinforce one 
another, and it helps to maintain a coherent image of the organization both in-
ternally and externally (Miller, 1992; Nadler et al., 1997; Porter, 1996; Soda and 
Zaheer, 2012). When there is major change, the success of an organization is 
dependent on ensuring that plans and decisions are in alignment and that the 
actions undertaken are consistent (Stettner and Lavie, 2014; Taylor and Helfat, 
2009); the effectiveness of specific organizational change efforts and strategies 
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depends on the degree to which they are aligned with other elements of the or-
ganization (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015; Whittington et al., 1999). In other words, 
the ability to achieve internal fit as conditions change is a key managerial capabil-
ity required for organizational change. Further advancing the contingency view, 
Donaldson (2001) developed the concept of quasi fit to address the issue that 
permanent disequilibrium requires a constant search for strategic and structural 
change and therefore perfect fit becomes of less relevance. Neo-contingency the-
orists conceptualize, and provide empirical support for, the benefits of ‘dynamic 
fit’ – that is, continuous alignment and realignment with internal resource pro-
files and with external environmental factors – when dealing with organizational 
change efforts (Zajac et al., 2000). The modern contingency view maintains that 
high performance is a consequence of co-alignment between a limited number 
of organizational and environmental factors (Volberda et al., 2012). From a con-
figurational perspective, Birkinshaw et al. (2016) contend that any of the alterna-
tive strategies for responding to discontinuous change are effective only if they 
are in harmony with the constellation of an organization’s vision, culture, and 
people development model. Other researchers argue for the importance of ‘fit’ 
by drawing on the complementary theory that contends that ‘doing more of one 
thing increases the returns to doing more of another’ (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1995, p. 181) and that changes in one activity may affect the benefits accruing 
from other activities. From this perspective, firms must find the best fit between 
various types of activity in order to achieve better performance (Huesch, 2013).
In spite of the pervasiveness of the ‘fit’ perspective and the intuitive benefits 
of organizational alignment in the face of change, there is emerging theoretical 
argumentation and empirical evidence to suggest that alignment may not always 
be either beneficial or applicable. As the desired functionality may sometimes lie 
in-between the steady-state functionality delivered by two discrete choices, such 
as two organizational forms, going for what appears to offer the best ‘fit’ choice 
may prove unproductive (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002). Instead, organizations 
may focus on modulating between alternative choices over time in order to enjoy 
the advantages of both. This is feasible because when the formal organization 
changes, the informal organization remains intact for a while, and the subsequent 
misalignment between the formal and informal organization allow the benefits 
of both options to be enjoyed concurrently (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Gulati and 
Puranam, 2009). Also, when the value of a resource is dependent on the context 
in which it is employed, a change in context may then take away the advantages of 
that resource (Priem and Butler, 2001), and an attempt to adapt one part of the 
system to a changing competitive landscape might destroy its fit with other parts 
of the system (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2015). This creates a conflict between 
the internal fit required for a smoothly functioning system and the external fit to 
a changing environment (Miller, 1993).
Such discussions brings into question the usefulness of internal fit as a uni-
versal solution for responding to disruption, particularly for organizations that 
have to balance many different factors. While these few studies might provide the 
 Embracing Bewilderment: Responding to Disruption 1083
© 2018 The Authors 
Journal of Management Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd and 
Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
initial ground for challenging conventional thinking, we are a long way from un-
derstanding the boundaries of internal fit, the mechanisms through which these 
boundaries work, or what the alternative solutions might be. Since large incum-
bents appear to face the most challenges in terms of dealing with disruption and 
have a greater number of factors to consider in how they respond to disruption, 
we set out to explore how large MNEs adapt to drastic technological change in 
their industry.
How MNEs Respond to Disruption
As MNEs operate in several different institutional, cultural, and economic con-
texts (Doz et al., 1981), the environment they have to work within when respond-
ing to disruption is highly complex. They have to deal with competing forces, 
some of which require local responsiveness from subsidiaries and others global 
integration under the umbrella of the MNE’s overall structure (Ghoshal and 
Nohria, 1989; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994, 1997), and reconciling these conflict-
ing forces often proves to be a serious challenge for headquarters (Meyer et al., 
2011).
So far research has considered only how headquarters influence the adoption 
of new strategies within individual subsidiaries, overlooking how MNEs can take 
orchestrated action to respond to disruption. We know that subsidiary character-
istics affect the absorption of information from headquarters (Markóczy, 2000; 
Schleimer and Pedersen, 2013) and that managing nested hierarchical relation-
ships across multiple organizational layers, and coordinating these relationships 
across diverse subunits embedded in different social contexts, can overcome such 
challenges (Hoenen and Kostova, 2015). Despite the importance of dealing with 
disruption for a firm’s survival, there is a lack of research on how MNEs can re-
spond to technological disruption. There are several reasons why responding to 
industry disruption is more challenging for MNEs than other organizations.
First of all, MNEs serve a multitude of customers who have different expec-
tations of the MNE, given that they are embedded in different environments. 
This is a key challenge for MNEs as we know that, due to resource dependency, 
their response can be affected by customers’ perceptions of the importance of 
disruption. Resource dependence theory suggests that a firm’s external resource 
providers, including customers, shape and constrain its internal strategic choices 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For instance, Gilbert (2005) finds that publishers’ 
decisions on whether to take their newspapers online were influenced by the in-
terest shown by advertisers in the new medium. This is understandable since a 
mismatch between a new offering and customer needs may prove to be extremely 
costly for the provider company (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). However, prior 
research has not given sufficient consideration to the possibility of differential re-
sponses from customers, nor has it provided any real clarity on the consequences 
of different responses from independent units of the organization. Indeed, cus-
tomers may differ in their willingness and ability to change, due to the particular 
characteristics of their company or the context in which they operate (Rogers, 
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2002; Xue et al., 2011) and this can have serious implications for an incumbent 
that is dependent on its customers (Priem et al., 2012). Moving to a new tech-
nology early on can be costly and can mean lost revenues since lead customers 
tend to be smaller in size and business volume than laggards (Christensen, 1997). 
Also, exploratory activities may backfire, taking the firm in a direction that is at 
odds with its existing business model and causing it to fall behind its competi-
tors, thus undermining its position. Conversely, customers who perceive the new 
technology to be truly disruptive might demand new solutions early on, as they 
might see this technology as being central to their own survival. As von Hippel 
(1988) contended, lead customers expect their supplier to demonstrate leader-
ship and active participation in radical change processes. In addition to providing 
resources to the incumbent, these early users can actually contribute to the devel-
opment of the new competencies and solutions (Lettl et al., 2006). Prior research 
on resource dependence suggests that heterogeneity creates challenges in terms 
of controlling the dependencies (Aharoni et al., 1981; Hillman et al., 2009). The 
discussion above also suggests that customer heterogeneity increases the chal-
lenges for incumbents in responding to disruption since it makes it more difficult 
for them to anticipate future demand.
Second, MNEs face particular difficulties in responding to disruption because 
foreign subsidiaries can also influence strategic behaviour at MNE headquarters 
(Andersson and Pahlberg, 1997; Andersson et al., 2007; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2011). Research advocates that, in order to understand the needs of different 
customer groups and how to address them profitably (e.g., Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989; Teece, 2007, 2010), MNEs should maintain an outside-in focus (McGrath, 
2010) and foreign subsidiaries should act as sensing mechanisms about the mar-
ket. The problem is that, because of market heterogeneity, mixed messages about 
customer expectations are likely to be received at MNE headquarters. While we 
know how MNEs can manage the trade-off between maximizing revenues by 
adapting to customer heterogeneity or minimizing costs through standardization 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1988), we do not know how they might manage such de-
mand heterogeneity when responding to disruption. In the case of technological 
disruption, the trade-off is much more complex and dramatic than the trade-off 
between local adaptation and standardization: here MNEs face much stronger 
tensions between their established business with its prevailing logic, structure, 
and culture, and a different business which involves new ways of creating and 
capturing value.
These tensions, stemming from the heterogeneity of MNEs’ markets, create an 
inordinate number of contingencies that complicate MNEs’ strategic manage-
ment and the capabilities required for adaptation (Teece, 2014). While we know 
that customer expectations are important for incumbents’ strategic decisions and 
behaviour, we do not know the mechanisms by which demand heterogeneity af-
fects these firms’ responses to disruption. With this study, we therefore attempt 
to learn more about the challenges that demand heterogeneity poses for MNEs 
facing disruption and how they might begin to overcome them.
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RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS
Our research context is the mobile telecommunication industry, and we chose 
Ericsson because the company is dealing with a new technology with major dis-
ruptive implications and extreme heterogeneity in the market. This particular 
industry has traditionally been populated by a few infrastructure providers that 
enable mobile service providers (mobile operators) in different countries and 
regions to provide telecommunications services to individuals and enterprises. 
For many years, technological developments were mostly gradual and incremen-
tal in nature: increases in bandwidth and speed of telecommunication and the 
introduction of multimedia services based on these advances. It was only re-
cently that the industry experienced the so-called ‘digital disruption’, in which 
Cloud computing is a key force (Ahmadi et al., 2017; Alexiou et al., 2018; Haug 
et al., 2016). The Cloud is expected to put an end to many of the existing busi-
ness models and technologies in the telecommunication sector. This context 
therefore provides a fertile ground for empirical investigation of technological 
disruption, and we selected Ericsson as one of the leading MNEs affected by this 
emergent disruption.
Data Collection
The focus of this study is theory-building and we therefore apply an inductive 
approach. Our focus is on extracting insights from the qualitative data, from in-
terviews and other textual data. As detailed below, we started by building a case 
archive and conducting exploratory interviews. We then investigated company 
documents which gave us a longitudinal perspective on the process of technology 
adoption. We subsequently undertook additional interviews, conducted a survey, 
and amassed a substantial collection of secondary data from various sources.
We employed four main sources of data to study the antecedents, contents, 
and outcomes of the Ericsson strategy in relation to Cloud technology: (1) 
interviews with senior managers who had been involved in Cloud technology 
adoption at Ericsson, plus our own notes from internal briefing sessions on 
Ericsson’s strategy from 2009 to 2016. The interviews focused on the key re-
search questions presented in this paper, and each was semi-structured, using a 
questionnaire with a set of prompts. Interviews typically lasted between 60 and 
90 minutes; (2) Ericsson’s internal archives, including strategy meeting presen-
tation slides and notes, an online forum, involving more than 1000 managers, 
where managers discuss Ericsson’s strategies, etc.; and (3) published reports, 
commentaries, and articles on the ICT industry, and analyses that were specific 
to Ericsson. In Table I we present details of the data sources and how these were 
used in our analysis.
Data Analysis
We applied a longitudinal case study approach to build a grounded theoretical 
model of how the incumbents respond to technological disruption when there 
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are heterogeneous customer demands. We used content analysis techniques 
to make sense of the data from our various sources. Starting from an analysis 
of the data, we developed a preliminary abstract theoretical model. To ensure 
a high level of credibility, consistency, and transferability, we followed estab-
lished methods: (1) long-time engagement with the field to ensure sufficient 
involvement with the context and data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985); (2) both 
retrospective and real-time data collection (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) 
from several different sources of data for triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989); 
and (3) thick description, and informant as well as outsider feedback to in-
crease the validity of our interpretations (Langley, 2007; Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). We now outline in detail the procedure used for the qualitative data 
analysis, where the research process was recursive and included feedback loops 
between each step.
Step 1: Drawing a timeline of events. We searched Ericsson’s intranet to extract any 
documents relating to Cloud computing issued during the period from 2008 
(three years before our data collection began) to 2014. We also asked relevant 
managers to share with us strategy material and documentation relating to specific 
projects and initiatives. Additionally, we secured access to a strategic management 
online forum in which around 1,000 of the company’s strategy managers and 
professionals present and debate key strategic issues. Cloud computing has been 
one of the top items for discussion for quite some time. This process enabled us to 
identify the sequence of key events which could then be used as a basis for further 
analysis of the events.
Step 2: Understanding the responses of MNEs and theory-building. Drawing on our data, 
we conducted formal interviews with 33 individuals, including managers from 
different business units, technology experts, and regional managers representing 
13 global regions in order to contextualize the data previously acquired. Given 
that our focus was on a global market, interviews with managers at the company’s 
headquarters as well as in its various subsidiaries were essential to address the 
research questions of this study.
To analyse the interview transcripts and other available data we used open, 
axial, and selective coding procedures (Strauss and Corbin, 2008). First, we used 
open coding to identify and group relevant concepts into categories. Then, we 
used axial coding to investigate the connections between the existing categories. 
We continued the analysis and allowed codes to emerge until we had a clear un-
derstanding of the relationship between different categories. The findings are 
based on repeated observation of a particular category in different interviews and 
the other data sources.
To this end, two of the authors began by identifying an initial set of salient 
concepts, particularly those relating to issues around technology disruption 
in different regions, and tried to identify patterns of similarity and differ-
ence. In addition to analysing the interview data, we did extensive analysis of 
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archival data, field memos, and publicly available data on Ericsson’s Cloud 
technology programs. This allowed us to investigate the conditions that gave 
rise to the phenomena under study, and to explore the connections between 
emerging concepts in our theoretical model. However, as there are limits to 
the causal interpretations we can make from the qualitative data, we found it 
useful to combine those data with quantitative data during the later stages of 
data collection and analysis. By using quantitative data and analysis, we went 
beyond a merely qualitative inquiry, enriching and expanding our analysis 
and ensuring the robustness of our findings (Creswell, 2009; Tunarosa and 
Glynn, 2016).
Step 3: Additional data collection to delineate the theory. Since our data 
collection and analysis were progressing in parallel, we were able to dig deep 
into our various sources of data and to ask interviewees questions that allowed 
us to corroborate or refine our coding. This approach was useful for zooming 
in on the dimensions of our theoretical model on the basis of more focused 
data collection and analyses.
We concluded by validating core concepts and relating them systematically 
to each other to form our data structure (Gioia et al., 2012; Saini and Shlonsky, 
2012). We used the memos and observations of one of the authors who had been 
researching Ericsson for more than five years. Furthermore, after any iteration 
or update two of the authors who had collected the data would cross-check their 
understandings, exploratory findings, and themes with respect to the research 
question and the theoretical lens being applied. These two authors would then 
present their new agreed understanding to the other two authors, who took 
on the role of ‘outsiders’ questioning their understanding. In parallel, one of 
the authors, a senior researcher at Ericsson, presented the exploratory find-
ings of this research to Ericsson managers dealing with the adoption of Cloud 
technology, in several focus group sessions. In this way, we were able to obtain 
and incorporate their comments to rectify and validate our interpretations of 
events, processes, and themes emerging in Ericsson’s adoption of this technol-
ogy. We devised these various means of refining our analytical schemes after first 
discussing within the research team the potential discrepancies in understand-
ing between researchers and practitioners (Evered and Louis, 1981; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).
Figure 1 illustrates a structure that contains the core concepts we found in 
our data. We categorized the relevant pieces of raw data – for instance, interview 
excerpts, quotations, or notes – as first-order concepts. The content of the sec-
ond-order categories was built based on the first category and was informed by 
existing theoretical views. We drew on the second-order categories to develop our 
theoretical model of the relationship between the antecedents of market hetero-
geneity in response to disruptive innovation and the consequences of this hetero-
geneity for MNEs.
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RESPONDING TO DISRUPTION IN HETEROGENEOUS MARKETS
Ericsson is a global provider of networking and telecommunications equipment 
and services, and after divesting its cell phone production unit in 2013, it now 
focuses solely on the business-to-business telecommunication market. The com-
pany was founded in 1876 in a small mechanical workshop and has grown to 
become a key player in communications technologies over the past 150 years. In 
2012, Ericsson had around 35 per cent of the global market and was the lead-
ing telecommunications company in terms of revenues. Since then, however, this 
position has been seriously challenged; in 2016, a Chinese competitor overtook 
Ericsson in revenues for the first time and Ericsson experienced a net loss after 
years of profitability. Although this worrying decline in performance became 
most apparent around 2015, the trend can be seen further back in history, and 
Ericsson’s key competitors have experienced similar problems (Figure 2).
Ericsson’s rapid growth in the past was due to its technical superiority and its 
capacity to sell reliable, high-quality equipment to major customers around the 
world. However, recent changes in the firm’s environment have put Ericsson’s 
success formula under threat. One main issue is that technological advances 
have meant that hardware products are becoming less and less valuable, and it 
is now virtually impossible for Ericsson to outcompete low-cost competitors on 
price. In fact, Ericsson’s customers are now less willing to invest in new hardware 
technologies, especially now that alternative solutions are emerging because of 
rapid technological changes. Traditionally, launching a new network service has 
Figure 1. Data structure
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often required large amounts of physical space to accommodate new products, 
and this is compounded by increasing energy costs, the need for substantial 
capital investment, and a shortage of skills in designing, integrating, and operat-
ing increasingly complex hardware-based appliances. Hardware appliances have 
a very short life cycle, requiring much of the procure-design-integrate-deploy 
cycle to be repeated with little or no revenue benefit. Even worse, hardware life 
cycles are now becoming even shorter as technology and services innovation 
accelerates, inhibiting the roll-out of new revenue-earning network services and 
constraining innovation in a world that is increasingly network-centric. The ad-
vent of Cloud computing technologies provides a new way of avoiding such costs 
and difficulties, even though it comes at the cost of disrupting Ericsson’s core 
business.
While the Cloud appears to Ericsson’s customers to be a sustainable innovation 
because it allows them to provide more and better services, exploiting this tech-
nology to the full is disruptive for Ericsson’s core technology and business model. 
First, Cloud makes it possible for many new entrants from the IT sector, both 
large and small, to provide services to operators. As the Cloud is open and no 
specialized hardware is required, many IT companies, including small software 
developers with only a handful of engineers, will effectively be able to provide 
Cloud-based functionality that is commensurate with what Ericsson delivers, with 
thousands of engineers. In the initial stages, Cloud solutions for mobile operators 
were fairly basic and less attractive to potential users, because of issues such as 
security and performance. However, when their full potential is realized, Cloud 
solutions are expected to upend existing markets and create a fertile ground for 
new entrants to take away the business of incumbents such as Ericsson. As shown 
in Figure 3, the main underlying technologies have been under development 
since the early years of the twenty-first century, and the technology became rela-
tively mature and ready for commercial use around 2014. Despite the availability 
of the technologies, adoption by providers of network services was delayed for a 
variety of reasons. Our focus in the qualitative data collection was on investigating 
the strategic aspects of the adoption of Cloud computing technologies by looking 
at key players in the telecommunication sector.
Figure 2. Forecasts for telecommunication infrastructure revenue, 2016–2020
Source: www.bloomberg.com [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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As a truly global organization, Ericsson follows a complex regional structure 
similar to that used by most modern MNEs. A few of Ericsson’s business units are 
specialized to deal with different products and solutions. These solutions need 
to fulfil the demands and expectations of mobile network operators in different 
markets. Given the importance and power of their customers, Ericsson and its 
competitors need to devote significant resources and attention to individual cus-
tomer units. Dedicated teams for technical and commercial sales, delivery, logis-
tics, and support are allocated to each customer to manage the relationships and 
fulfil their expectations. Although corporate-level strategic decisions are man-
aged at corporate headquarters, input from dispersed units is a key ingredient 
in Ericsson’s technology and market strategies in that key customers can ask the 
CEO or other senior managers to meet certain expectations, and can do so either 
directly or indirectly via Ericsson’s key account managers.
When it comes to roll-out of the telecommunication standard technologies, it is 
quite usual for Ericsson to start the initial trials with lead customers who are tech-
nically and financially stronger and can afford the costs of rolling out the next 
generation of technologies so that they can enjoy the benefits of differentiation. 
This phased roll-out procedure, however, forms part of the long-term strategic 
product roadmap of the company and is done in a way that is very coordinated 
and aligned in terms of timing and speed of implementation. The Cloud, how-
ever, was not part of such plans, and its emergence and development has been too 
uncertain to allow Ericsson to formulate a unified technology strategy, letalone 
develop a coordinated roll-out plan.
Market Heterogeneity
As a technology-driven company, Ericsson has been quick to realize the impor-
tance of Cloud-based technologies[1] and their implications. The company has 
a clear ambition to become a leader both during the emergent technological 
change and after it, and in 2012 it announced its plan to develop a platform that 
would enable operators to drive new revenues and evolve network capabilities.
Figure 3. An indication of the growth of Cloud computing technologies
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However, realizing this ambition has proved to be much more challenging. A 
key barrier to Ericsson’s response to disruption is the market heterogeneity as 
its clients differ in how rapidly and to what extent they expect to adopt Cloud 
technologies. While one group of mobile operators have signalled a clear and 
ambitious intent to use Cloud technologies to redefine their networks and offer-
ings, others are seeking mainly to use these technologies for efficiency gains and 
are not contemplating any major overhaul of their own technologies or offerings. 
Furthermore, in both groups there are some companies that started to adopt the 
new technology quite early on and proceeded swiftly with initial projects, while 
there are others that have delayed both their initial investments and their plans.
Our data (survey and archival) from 114 Ericsson customer accounts (see sur-
vey questionnaire in Appendix) indicates a large degree of heterogeneity in its 
customers’ expectations regarding the Cloud, showing these to vary according to 
their geographic location. Market-driven factors are linked to macroeconomic fac-
tors in different regions that affect the availability of resources and the motivation 
to embark on the risky and substantial investment required to deal with a disrup-
tive technology. Our data show that 17 per cent of operators from less developed 
or developing regions aim to adopt a wide and conflicting range of Cloud technol-
ogies; in developed regions similar ambitions are found in around 23 per cent of 
operators. In addition, operators from less developed and developing regions tend 
to favour Cloud technologies that enable innovation rather than technologies to 
improve efficiency. This is very different from the operators from developed re-
gions. In North America, Western Europe, and North East Asia we saw there was 
greater eagerness to invest in Cloud technologies and a stronger sense of momen-
tum; this was true of 27 per cent of operators in these regions, while in other parts 
of the world only 7 per cent of operators were lead adopters of the Cloud tech-
nologies. In some other regions, there were few mobile operators who had made 
any significant effort to adopt Cloud technologies. In addition, there are regional 
differences in the magnitude of Cloud technology adoption. Customers from de-
veloped markets are either highly or moderately ambitious in terms of their plans 
to adopt Cloud technologies, whereas those from developing markets have only 
low to moderate ambition. For instance, 40 per cent of the operators in developed 
markets tend to invest in quite a wide scope of Cloud technologies.
Market heterogeneity has important implications for Ericsson and its response 
to disruption. Aligning itself to key customers and their strategies has been a 
cornerstone of Ericsson’s strategy, and, given the increased competition, it has 
become especially important for the company to understand its customers’ needs 
and plans and to try to influence them whenever possible. Due to its large size, 
Ericsson is dependent on repeat and new business from its global customers – 
and failure to be responsive to customers’ expectations and demands may result 
in business being lost to competitors. Prioritizing one particular group of cus-
tomers may not necessarily be the most appropriate approach, as it is difficult 
to predict how the industry may evolve, what the implications this might have 
for Ericsson, and how it could respond appropriately. To add to this confusion, 
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there are also uncertainties about how aggressive competitors from the IT indus-
try might target different parts of the telecommunication market with respect to 
Cloud technologies.
The diverse requests from customers make it impossible for decision-makers 
and managers at different levels within the organization to share a common un-
derstanding of what is happening and what needs to be done. We now discuss the 
conflicting interpretations within Ericsson regarding the market dynamics and 
the contradictory responses in terms of (1) experiments and trials, (2) deploy-
ment of resources, and (3) ecosystem strategies.
Conflicting Interpretations of the Market Dynamics
While managers have their own predispositions – for example, because of indi-
vidual differences and the specific division that they work in – the input from 
specific markets and customers encourages them to develop different under-
standings of the future, even though these may not be in line with the official 
stance of the organization. As a result, at any one point in time there will be 
different interpretations of the magnitude and speed of change in different stra-
tegic organizational units, and within any one unit these interpretations will also 
vary over time. To show more clearly how these understandings differ, we present 
four interpretations of the market dynamics that differ in their estimation of tim-
ing and magnitude of the potential impact.
In the first interpretation, there is an expectation that customers will make 
some significant advances, but not very rapidly. According to this interpretation, 
a considerable proportion of the current network hardware and structure will be 
affected, but important parts of it will remain intact for the foreseeable future. 
The reason for this rather slow transition process is that first-mover customers will 
encounter various challenges in adapting their business, as was concluded in one 
of Ericsson’s strategy discussions:
‘[Cloud] technologies and [their] use-cases [i.e., application] gradually mature to gener-
ate tangible benefits for operators, but complexity and investment limitations continue to 
cap deployment speed. Lead customers will still be a key challenge. [Especially,] the cost 
and revenue advantages of NFV [i.e., one of the Cloud technologies] are confirmed but 
complexity will remain a challenge. Lead operators can meetalmost all milestones and the 
industry standards are mature by 2020’.
The second interpretation foresees a similarly radical change, but one that 
takes place more rapidly. This view of the future predicts that first-movers will be 
very successful in their initial activities and assumes a fast business-driven change, 
reorganization, and changes in managerial practices. The expectation is that a 
large proportion of the telecom operators’ current networks, infrastructure, and 
hardware will be replaced by Cloud technologies in the near future and only a 
small part will remain intact. Managers with this type of view of the future believe, 
for instance, that:
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‘Large first-movers will have fully realized their IT/Telco Cloud ambition, and deployed 
completely virtualized and de-coupled multi-vendor solutions, in a five-year period of 
time [from 2014]. Followers will have also developed and accomplished their IT/Telco 
Cloud ambitions’.
The third interpretation foresees a rapid but less drastic transition to the new 
Cloud technologies, in which a large proportion of the network remains un-
changed; only the most feasible and convenient aspects will be replaced by Cloud 
technologies, with the aim being to generate additional revenues or cost savings 
without any need for major adaptations. An Ericsson manager summarized this 
as:
‘After the first wave of investments, the ambitions of operators will diminish because of a 
lack of expected benefits of the Cloud … The complexities of technology deployment will be 
uncovered: for example, interoperability issues place practical limitations on multi-ven-
dor implementations as promised by the Cloud technologies. The result is a reduced scope 
of virtualization plans’.
The fourth and last interpretation is one likely to be made by those who are 
suspicious of any radical change and who envisage that the failure of initial activi-
ties, due to factors such as slow progress in the activities required for standardiza-
tion, will stop any important adaptation taking place for the foreseeable future. 
According to this interpretation, only a relatively insignificant proportion of the 
networks will be affected. This type of view was expressed by some Ericsson man-
agers in a strategy discussion as follows:
‘In the telecom history, we have had other technological fads that did not make opera-
tors to radically change their core technologies … Cloud technologies’ cost and revenue 
advantages are not proven … . This will not change in the near future. We should keep 
working on the quality and efficiency of our native technologies as they are the sources of 
our advantage. Perhaps [we can still] use the Cloud for this purpose too’.
These various interpretations of the market dynamics were influential in driv-
ing the actions of those who held them. A large organization like Ericsson is 
decentralized to a large extent, and paying attention to customers’ input is al-
ways considered a priority. It is thus seen as a legitimate reason for action even 
when the action is not in harmony with the organization’s official stance. As we 
implied earlier, these interpretations were not formed arbitrarily, but were often 
a direct reflection of customers’ expressed plans of action in the short and the 
long term. It is important to note that, in terms of the organization’s overall po-
sition, the desire to minimize the disruptive effects of Cloud technologies was 
aligned more closely to the interpretation in which change is seen as likely to 
be slower and more limited in scope. Conversely, those interpretations which 
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predict the changes to be both more extensive and more rapid are much less in 
alignment with the organization’s official position. Despite this lack of alignment, 
the regional units whose customers favour more radical approaches to the Cloud 
largely support such interpretations and regard them as a legitimate basis for 
action.
The fact that there are competing interpretations of the market dynamics, each 
involving conflicting assumptions about the technical and business implications, 
raises some important issues for the MNE. When there are multiple answers to 
the question of what is happening, this will inevitably affect key aspects of the pro-
cess of adopting and implementing a potentially disruptive technology. Below, we 
discuss three specific types of contradiction that arise from market heterogeneity 
and how they affect different stages in the innovation process.
Experimentation and Trials
To a large extent, telecom firms use trials and proof of concepts to help them 
make sense of the commercial values and work out the optimal implementation 
strategies for Cloud technologies. Keeping up with new technological trends 
compels firms to experiment in a variety of ways in their technology research and 
development, as one technology manager acknowledged:
‘[T]echnology evolution is so fast these days … that if you as a product/systems owner 
don’t regularly (every quarter) set aside money to evolve your technology base – even 
though no customer is asking for it – you will eventually find yourself with such a huge 
technology backlog that you have to start from scratch when suddenly it becomes a re-
quirement from your customers – and you have to choose wisely because not all technology 
trends lead into the future’.
Finding the right approach to collaboration in these initial investments (Moeen, 
2017) was a key strategic issue for Ericsson, and the existence of competing visions 
of the future makes it difficult to make a choice. Initially (2010), the experimen-
tations were mostly small prototypes being developed by a dozen researchers at 
Ericsson headquarters. Expanding such activities required larger investment and 
more involvement from strategic business units and regional organizations. It was 
at this time that some key customers in various regions also started to ask Ericsson 
to participate in their Cloud-related developments and trials. The challenge here 
is that the success and failure of initial trials with key customers to a large extent 
determines future technological trajectories, and Ericsson often has to be care-
ful therefore when committing to new development projects. In the case of the 
Cloud, however, the divergent customer plans and demands led to engagement 
in several streams of experimental activities which were not necessarily aligned 
with one another. One of the strategy managers involved in such projects explains 
what they were focused on in their initial development activities:
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‘The underlying hardware platform will not be our unique selling point anyway. [We 
should] allow ourselves to focus on the differentiating functionality of our services […] 
and quickly launch trials where there are opportunities and see if the business takes off’.
There were other more radical initiatives launched at this time. In Budapest, 
for example, Ericsson introduced a new concept called Ericsson Garage, de-
signed to take a more fundamental approach to Cloud-related innovations. In 
this new platform, Ericsson envisioned having little control over the types of 
activities being undertaken by entrepreneurs, and therefore divergent experi-
mentations were inevitable. The head of the garage explained the purpose of 
this initiative:
‘I believe the new Ericsson Garage will strengthen our foundation for creating sustainable 
business for Ericsson and its customers in a networked society. For example, we can look 
at one area that the garage will showcase: Cloud and virtualization technologies as the 
first step. We believe this area will transform the economics of delivering new services to 
market’.
Besides the divergent and more radical trials, Ericsson started to collaborate 
in some focused trials with a number of key customers in different locations 
who were focusing mainly on gradual and incremental projects designed to 
add limited Cloud functionalities to their infrastructure. These projects were 
indeed quite successful in delivering the intended outcome and were celebrated 
as initial Cloud successes. In addition, Ericsson tried to create some dedicated 
resources focused on addressing customer demands with respect to the Cloud. 
In 2014, the firm opened three experimental labs, in Germany, Italy, and South 
Korea.
In sum, Ericsson was following different trials with varying motivations. Some 
were more internally focused, slower-paced, and more conservative, and were 
designed to provide ‘More local expertise close to the customers [and] be more open, lis-
tening, and sales driven’ (SUR, ACM1114). Others were aimed at more rapid and 
larger-scale change in the industry. Account managers supported this second idea 
when they said, ‘[Ericsson should] dramatically embrace a strategic IT transformation 
partner role’ … and ‘have relevant competence and capabilities on the ground’ (SUR, 
ACM1114). However, involvement in many diverse experimental projects, each 
with a different magnitude and speed, is costly in terms of the effort required.
Deployment Strategy
Another key question for Ericsson concerned the plan for product road maps 
and the changes required for commercial deployment, or market entry (Moeen, 
2017), of Cloud technologies in existing products. Different interpretations of 
the future result in different approaches to updating and revising the product 
roadmap and strategic plans used as the basis for operations by thousands of 
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product managers and engineers at Ericsson. At Ericsson, product roadmaps are 
meant to be intact and many groups of managers and engineers, who had a con-
servative interpretation of future, simply updated their product plans by adding 
Cloud technologies on top of existing technologies. These groups worked closely 
with large customer organizations who also had a conservative understanding 
of future and a tendency to preserve their prior investments and technological 
stability.
More radical interpretations of the future were used when setting deployment 
strategies as well. Those who held such views suggested that the existing architec-
ture and related complementary assets should be discarded in favour of a new 
architecture and assets, and to what extent this should be done.
In line with this interpretation of the future, a group of experts at Ericsson 
started to develop new software applications that were not dependent on the 
firm’s legacy networks and were therefore attempting to deploy projects that were 
largely independent from Ericsson’s existing product roadmaps. When dealing 
with more progressive customers, it was important to emphasize this approach 
in order to position Ericsson as a reliable partner in more radical innovation 
projects. As one operations manager said: ‘[At Ericsson, we] have to fully align and 
‘cloudify’ and virtualize our [product and service] portfolios’ (FOR, CLD-515).
As one would expect, the radical approaches towards change were not focused 
on a single path to change, and issues relating to several different architectural and 
business models were given serious debate. For example, whether Ericsson should 
utilize third-party data centres or should establish its own data centres was an im-
portant consideration when discussing cloudification of the telecom network:
‘Personally I’m [a] little bit concerned with a strategy where we basically would 
just be providing some of the software running in Amazon’s data centers. […] 
We have been around a lot longer than Amazon and are also building data 
centers for our own needs anyway. Why not leverage that investment to also 
provide hosted services to operators?’
Long-Term Ecosystem Strategy
Cloud and related technologies were expected to have effects that go beyond firm 
boundaries, and this may entail the potential for addressing new markets and 
customers. While addressing the divergent demands from existing customers is 
already problematic, attempting to underrtake innovation activities focused on 
new types of customer in the emerging ecosystem complicated things even more. 
Misalignment with the speed and scope of some customers was inevitable, as we 
have already discussed; however, working against the interests of the current cus-
tomer category (i.e. mobile operators) by developing solutions that did not sup-
port customers’ businesses was perceived to be inherently problematic. This was 
not only because the firm was expected to show loyalty to its existing customers, 
but also because a shortage of resources made it difficult to carry out exploration 
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activities focused on the firm’s existing customers and ecosystem. Therefore, 
many of the managers believed that Ericsson must ‘excel at [its] core business before 
branching out’, meaning that it was important for the firm to maintain and nur-
ture its existing role in a business ecosystem that remained more or less the same.
Ericsson started to engage in several new segments, including transportation, 
government, utilities, health, and education to develop Cloud technologies that 
would serve customers outside its traditional market segment. The importance of 
new customer segments and groups in the emergent ecosystem was not in doubt. 
In the words of Ericsson’s CEO:
‘We are focusing on increased visibility and scale of skills in [new customer 
categories, which are] IT and Cloud, media, and industry and society to better 
support [these new categories of] customers in their digital transformation. It 
is now the right time to seize further opportunities by better aligning to their 
needs, both of our existing customers, and also new customers in segments 
beyond the traditional telecom space’.
The activities in these new segments were in constant competition with those in 
the regular market, and because of the prominence and power of conventional 
businesses, it was often very challenging to secure the required competence and 
resources to explore new markets.
In addition to questions over the roles of existing and new customers, Ericsson’s 
supplier and partnership strategies were also subject to different interpretations. 
Those with more radical visions of the future tended to favour redefining the role 
of the technology provider and focusing on who the suppliers and allies were 
likely to be in the longer term. This group maintained that, with respect to sup-
pliers, Ericsson needed to make important changes:
‘[Ericsson] currently [has] limitations or dependencies with 3PP [i.e., third-
party providers] and needs to lead the segment and to be considered ICT 
leader company in 2020. Ericsson has to engage in a better corporate venturing 
and partnership abilities to tap into the growing number of start-ups driving 
innovation in the ICT industry. For example, [they should] create strategic al-
liances with Silicon Valley key influential companies in the Cloud ecosystem’.
According to this group of managers, Ericsson needed to increase its ‘go-to-mar-
ket-ability to sell jointly to new end-markets’. In our online survey account managers 
reflected on what they saw as responses to the change needed in the ecosystem, 
referring to the importance of ‘open integrations for non-Ericsson equipment (at least 
the image should change)’ and of ‘not pushing for Ericsson Cloud but rather being open 
to accepting ANY Cloud interpretation coming from customers that can be very different’. 
They also made the point that ‘large operators focus on hardware savings where Ericsson 
is too expensive. [Therefore, it is needed to] focus on providing vertical integration with IT 
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companies to develop on E2E system integration capabilities [because we will not be able to 
sell all our native hardware]’.
The fundamental issue here is that focusing on developing a new ecosystem and 
businesses is not in line with maintaining an ongoing commitment to the firm’s 
current networks of suppliers, customers, and complementors. In fact, some as-
pects of future ecosystems may directly damage existing allies, and supporting this 
kind of change may have negative consequences for the firm. Table II presents 
a number of representative quotations which highlight the tensions created by 
market heterogeneity.
In this section, we have shown how differing understandings and interpreta-
tions of the future influence managers’ approaches to innovation processes. Each 
of the regional and customer units were attempting to do something to satisfy the 
demands of their own customer groups. Specifically, this analysis suggests that 
different regional and customer units within Ericsson were adopting different 
approaches to experimentation and trials which were inconsistent with one an-
other and sometimes with the official stance of the company. While the business 
unit managers tended to favor more incremental and gradual approaches to in-
novation activities and strategies that would help reduce the disruptive effects of 
the Cloud, Ericsson’s research department and units that were dealing with more 
ambitious customers were looking at more radical trials and at deployment and 
ecosystem strategies. In the next section, we look at how such inconsistencies af-
fected Ericsson’s strategic choices and behaviour.
ACCOMMODATING A COMPLEX INNOVATION PROCESS
We have highlighted how there were multiple visions of the future that were 
rooted in market heterogeneity and that led to complexities in Ericsson’s inno-
vation processes and strategies with respect to the Cloud. While the list of in-
consistencies that we present is not meant to be exhaustive, it creates a basis for 
understanding the types of strategic dilemma that an MNE must deal with when 
there is technological disruption on a global scale. Differences in interpretations 
of the future and thus in approaches to the innovation process have important 
implications for key dimensions of Ericsson’s strategy, particularly its strategic 
direction, structure, and resource reconfiguration. In Table III we present repre-
sentative evidence of these implications.
Strategic direction
As highlighted above, for legitimate reasons, different groups of decision-makers 
had different visions of the future and therefore tended to favour approaches 
that were inconsistent with one another. Ericsson’s senior management used an 
approach that resulted in a high level of ambiguity in the firm’s formal strategies 
with respect to the Cloud and meant that managers and units were able to en-
gage in very different innovation activities and approaches. Giving out seemingly 
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contradictory messages, and letting business units follow their own preferred 
strategies, were some of the ways in which the firm’s approach to strategic direc-
tion allowed these very different activities to evolve. For instance, looking only 
at Ericsson’s vision and formal strategies, one might infer the company had put 
emphasis on a high level of alignment in Cloud-related strategies. For example, 
in 2010 Ericsson’s CEO formulated a clear vision for the company, one which 
reflected its aspiration to be the industry leader, and stated that he expected an 
aligned approach to change:
‘Management has taken action to adapt the company to this change that is an 
important foundation for Ericsson’s future growth. […] We will get there with 
aligned strategies in all of the business units, as well as with our joint ventures’ 
Ericsson CEO, internal blog, 2010
However, and despite emphasizing the need for ‘full alignment of all regional and 
business unit strategies’ in several of his communications, the CEO also stressed the 
importance of a ‘customer-first perspective’, which implied that Ericsson must 
work hard to understand operators’ needs, objectives, and constraints. He went 
on to say that:
‘In today’s market, however, we are seeing a clear shift toward building cus-
tomer intimacy by being more agile, more flexible, and responding to cus-
tomer demands with a different mix of specific solutions and global ones. Our 
primary aim is to help customers reach their targets and address their needs’ 
Ericsson CEO letter, 2010 annual report.
Hence, while strategic alignment was being emphasized, great attention was 
also being paid to responsiveness to customer-specific demands and expectations. 
Indeed, the emphasis on responsiveness to and closeness with a heterogeneous 
market – and high levels of decentralization and delegation to enable this – gave 
rise to contradictory visions of the future in different parts of the organization 
and reduced the pressure to pursue a uniform global strategy. Hence, the high-
level vision of the organization did not result in a correspondingly high degree 
of alignment and harmony in the actions taken by the organization. In fact, it was 
apparent that those units and employees dealing with less advanced customers 
or with developing countries were focusing on less radical variants of the strategy 
and taking a more gradual path towards Cloud deployment. Others tended to 
focus on visions of the future in which the existing network structure and the as-
sociated products and solutions would have to change substantially and in which 
incremental changes to existing products were perceived to be less valuable. 
Despite not being aligned to one another or to the official strategy, the various 
approaches to Cloud adoption and implementation still had a high degree of le-
gitimacy, because each was supported by a reasonably large customer base.
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Structure
Our observations confirm that there is a pattern in the density of individuals and 
groups within the firm who favoured particular visions, and this maps to the or-
ganizational structure. While the disruptive impact of the Cloud concerns almost 
every aspect of Ericsson’s products and services, in the earlier stages of technolog-
ical change only those groups that were outside the existing business units tended 
to be strongly in favour of a radical approach to Cloud deployment. The business 
units demonstrated little willingness to support ambitious plans as this was not 
in keeping with their existing incentive structures and abilities. A manager who 
had been involved in developing Cloud-related services explained how the initial 
processes in Cloud-related innovation worked:
‘We have these innovation cells which are small teams which have a goal, but 
they don’t have processes and just work on a daily basis. Of course, a company 
can always have these innovation cells. But the difficulty is when you have ini-
tiatives, such as ten innovation cells in parallel, and all of them go back to the 
existing line organization – which is modular, as we talked about – looking for 
information and assistance, and so on. Then we start to overload these tradi-
tional modules with work that they are not dimensioned for, so the innovation 
cells will not get the support that they need and that will become a pain in the 
neck for the module’.
Intensified competition meant that the business units were under pressure to 
achieve greater efficiency and performance, and investment in future visions that 
could potentially undermine existing revenue streams was not a preferred option 
for business unit managers. Reliance on existing customers and their investment 
plans was a key reason why units were unwilling to support a radical move. The issue 
became apparent to senior managers when they received a signal from a few lead-
ing customers that Ericsson was being perceived as a laggard in terms of the Cloud. 
This was a trigger for several rounds of restructuring. The main reason behind the 
restructuring was to create a cross-functional team that would be in keeping with 
the disruptive nature of the Cloud, which affected all teams within the business. 
Creating such a team would also be in line with the plans of the company’s more am-
bitious customers. One manager explained the initiation of this program as follows:
‘… we started to get RFQs from one key customer in the Cloud area. And also 
we had a lot of questions around not only new solutions but also how our ex-
isting portfolio would transform related to Cloud – and service-based applica-
tions, and so on. So, the Cloud program was initiated’.
Having a centralized lead and access to resources from different business 
units seemed to be the right solution for proceeding with strategy formulation, 
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experimentation and trials, and other activities required in order to respond 
to market demand for ambitious utilization of Cloud potential. Starting with a 
small cross-unit team to develop Cloud technologies, company managers soon 
realized that it was very difficult to access resources dispersed across different 
business units that were themselves busy dealing with existing situations in the 
market. In order to overcome this, the company decided to dedicate more 
and more resources to a cross-unit Cloud initiative. Although this approach 
had some advantages in terms of allocating resources to more ambitious ex-
perimental projects, the cross-unit initiative became too large, creating many 
administrative issues. The company decided to dissolve the cross-functional 
unit and to embed it within the largest business unit, which had most of the 
available organizational resources. One manager described this change as 
follows:
‘… the Cloud program set up was a good start but sooner or later it had to be 
transferred to something else. I think when we want to spend a lot of money 
and so on, then that will be typically handed over to a line organization that 
we decide’.
Although this move eliminated the administrative issues connected with hav-
ing a temporary unit, and at the same time allowed ambitious Cloud projects 
to continue, it did not take long before the pressure to generate revenue and 
achieve financial targets meant that more ambitious projects and activities 
were losing out to more incremental development projects. Another round of 
cross-functional activities began but the results were not regarded as adequate. 
It was at this point that the company decided to go for two major restructurings 
that resulted in a new business unit dedicated to Cloud technologies. While 
having a new business unit with its own resources to some extent guaranteed a 
longer-term orientation to development activities, the fact that it was a profit 
center drove the new unit to seek more immediate revenue streams, bringing it 
more into line with the slower and less ambitious plans. More cross-functional 
projects were therefore needed to ensure that the company maintained a focus 
on more radical visions. At the time of writing this paper, there have been 
around seven years of repeated restructuring and reassignment of resources for 
Cloud technologies, and these changes – albeit all made for legitimate reasons 
– have been very costly and created tensions within the organization. Employees 
often perceive the changes as stemming from a lack of vision and sometimes 
become frustrated because of the uncertainties surrounding the structure of 
Cloud initiatives.
From the negative experiences of employees during the various restructur-
ings one could conclude that the changes made were either based on poor 
decisions or badly executed, but one needs also to recognize the complexity of 
the problems involved. It is also important to note that, although the cross-func-
tional unit was officially responsible for dealing with the Cloud, this does not 
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mean that other groups were not active in this area. On the contrary, several 
research groups and business units had their own initiatives, addressing their 
own interests. There was thus a complex combination of separate cross-func-
tional teams and integrated intra-unit projects dealing concurrently with the 
new technology.
Configuration of resources
The focus on specific visions of the future has implications for the ways in which 
existing organizational resources, particularly human resources, are planned for 
and reconfigured. An Ericsson strategist put this in the following words:
‘[To] leverage the market transitions in the right way, it will require changes to 
culture, incentives, organization, and new talents and new investments’.
A slower and less ambitious transition would enable Ericsson to evolve more 
gradually and redeploy its existing staff through training and development pro-
grams. As those in the older generation leave, the firm would be able to recruit 
people with new competences. This approach to redeploying employees may min-
imize internal challenges and tensions as well as issues with unions and other 
stakeholders. Two operational managers working on the development of Cloud 
technology talked about on-the-job training in the following terms:
‘[With respect to the Cloud,] we really have the needed competence, also here, 
even if it’s of course, a fairly limited amount of people. We didn’t hire so many 
people. Very few. … [L]earning in Ericsson over the years has become much, 
much more on-the-job training… it’s very much around trying to get people to 
work where we have the action [for Cloud technology development] … ‘
‘people take a huge responsibility for training themselves to keep abreast of tech-
nology development and I was impressed with what they knew and achieved… ‘
One key approach for developing capabilities and resource from this perspec-
tive is to gather a cross-functional group of engineers to learn by working on the 
technology, and then to dismantle the team and spread that knowledge through-
out the organization.
‘One of the ideas with the initial Cloud program was to get people doing things 
together, to have a chance to get other people in that project to learn and to 
have hands on experience during the pilots, trials and so on. Then they go 
back to their organizations [and spread the learning] … today, it’s going to 
be much more around this competence spreading as we’re doing something 
between the regions, but really trying to identify where do we have the sources 
of knowledge [to spread]’.
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However, where the vision was more radical, a large proportion of the compa-
ny’s current employees did not have the requisite skills and abilities, and the com-
pany needed to recruit many new people, with a different set of competences. 
Acquiring these new recruits, however, necessitated major cutbacks. According to 
Ericsson’s annual reports, between 2010 and 2014 an average of 13,500 employees 
left the firm each year and 16,500 employees joined, while the total headcount 
per year averaged around 110,000 persons. The number of employees leaving the 
company increased over this period.
The business units naturally favoured redeploying existing staff and avoiding 
major changes in order to continue the planned evolution of products which 
most of the units’ customers had built into their plans. The issue was that when 
business units were pursuing their deployment plans, they were likely to fa-
vour the immediate and least ambitious approaches, mainly because of the 
difficulties associated with major reconfiguration of resources. However, once 
the technology started to have an impact on different parts of the product 
portfolio, it became apparent that certain groups of employees were no longer 
needed, and at the same time and could not be developed in the short run. The 
only solution to this was to lay off a large group of experienced people and to 
recruit new staff. While such solutions resolved some of the problems regard-
ing the competences and skills required to deal with Cloud technologies, the 
tensions and challenges associated with laying people off made it even harder 
to start bringing in any new recruits until the next round of major resource 
reconfiguration.
Our observations confirm that the firm tried out a variety of contrary strategies 
and approaches in order to enable an innovation process, which itself contained 
inconsistencies; this was a reflection of the different and often contradictory 
visions of the future that existed within the organization. Analysing Ericsson’s 
case, we identified some desirable outcomes as well a number of unresolved 
challenges.
Our analyses suggest that Ericsson was able to leverage strategic ambiguity in 
internal communication to stimulate and legitimize a range of different activities. 
An important enabler here was the decentralized organization that was helpful in 
letting people make their own interpretations based on market insights that were 
not necessarily available to central decision-makers. Being open to and capable 
of making swift structural changes, sometimes involving thousands of individu-
als, and able to embrace the subsequent challenges so that the new technology 
could be adopted was certainly necessary and helpful for dealing with the fact 
that there was no one shared interpretation of the future. Finally, having a variety 
of resource development and acquisition strategies enabled the organization to 
accommodate both radical and more gradually evolving views of what the future 
might hold.
On the negative side, however, it has proved quite challenging for Ericsson 
to accommodate those visions of the future that were outside the organiza-
tion’s comfort zone or not in line with its official position. Several progressive 
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members of the organization told us that they are allowed to do the research 
that they want, even if their activities are at odds with what senior manag-
ers are asking for. However, when they require support and resources from 
other units which foresee changes taking place at a slower pace and in a more 
limited way, they will not be given what they need to succeed. Also, while 
with more radical approaches failures are understandably more common, 
and while those who favour a more cautious and conservative approach can 
demonstrate initial success relatively quickly, by securing trials and even con-
tracts with customers, with more advanced innovation the learning outcomes 
often look less impressive – even to customers who advocate a more ambitious 
approach. Hence, while senior managers allow competing interpretations and 
activities to co-exist, it does not mean that these are given equal amounts of 
attention and resources.
A MODEL OF FIRM RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL DISRUPTION IN 
HETEROGENEOUS MARKET ENVIRONMENTS
In this section, we reiterate the model of responding to technological disrup-
tion when firms face market heterogeneity. Ericsson’s efforts to respond to the 
rise of Cloud technology and the risk that its value creation and capture models 
would become obsolete indicate that market heterogeneity creates a situation 
in which a direct and unified response to disruption might be less appropri-
ate than a response which uses misaligned and contradictory approaches to 
address the environmental complexity. Large MNEs like Ericsson are embed-
ded in multiple environments with different technological sophistication and 
demand requirements. This leads to different interpretations of the future in 
different parts of the organization. That is, while there might be agreement 
across the organization that there needs to be a response to disruption, there 
can be significant disagreement regarding the scale and the speed of changes 
required. This is not merely a matter of different perceptions in different orga-
nizational units but is grounded in actual differences between customer needs 
in different markets.
A successful response to disruption in conditions of market heterogeneity is 
one that preserves the firm’s strategic relationships with heterogeneous custom-
ers and one that allows strategic flexibility (Khanagha et al., 2017; Volberda, 1996) 
to expand the range of strategic options available to the firm – in other words, a 
response that allows the firm to implement change in a way that does not lead to 
the loss of key customers or lock it early on into a response that eventually proves 
inappropriate. As the Ericsson case suggests, developing such a response involves 
establishing a complex innovation process and managing internal misalignment 
to support divergent approaches to innovation. A complex innovation process 
is one that accommodates various approaches to experimentation (e.g., invest-
ment in radical new models of centralized innovation but also decentralized tri-
als with key customers), varying deployment strategies (e.g., providing solutions 
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close to the existing portfolio of offerings and also redefining the portfolio), and 
engagement in divergent long-term ecosystem strategies (e.g., on the one hand 
supporting the existing ecosystem by investing in initiatives with existing suppli-
ers and customers, while on the other hand disturbing that existing ecosystem by 
questioning who the firm’s suppliers and partners should be in the long term). 
Having this kind of flexibility within the innovation process allow firms to deal 
with differing expectations in different parts of the organization regarding the 
magnitude and speed of response and the complex environment in which they 
operate.
These discrepancies in the innovation process – rooted in the different inter-
pretations of the future in different parts of the organization – are possible only if 
the organization allows there to be internal misalignment regarding its strategic 
direction, structure, and reconfiguration of resources. While the top leadership 
provides a clear message that responding to disruption is essential for the firm’s 
survival, it might support multiple interpretations of the future in global units by 
giving ambiguous signals as to whether it favours a unified or more multi-pronged 
organizational response. The Ericsson CEO achieved this by formulating a clear 
vision of a unified response to the Cloud, while outlining customer-focused strat-
egies in other communications. In addition, to allow for the different approaches 
in the innovation process, organizations need to manage internal misalignment 
with respect to the organizational structure. Structural flexibility characterized by 
fluidity between a multiplicity of approaches to structuring ranging between un-
coordinated and decentralized structures to highly coordinated and centralized. 
In the Ericsson case, this was visible in how the company switched between differ-
ent ways of structuring its Cloud-related research efforts, going from centralized 
to decentralized, and vice-versa. Organizations can allow for inconsistencies in 
the innovation process by providing resources for divergent paths. This can be 
done by alternating between redeploying existing resources and acquiring new 
resources.
The proposed model for responding to disruption is likely to be more appro-
priate in situations where there is high market heterogeneity of the kind faced 
by MNEs, rather than in the more homogeneous markets served by some other 
firms. Similarly, this approach might be more appropriate than a unified organi-
zational response when it is unclear what the best form of response should be. A 
key challenge in the approach taken by Ericsson is that leaders need to be capable 
of overseeing organizational misalignment. This requires leaders to be capable 
of embracing strategic contradictions (Mihalache et al., 2014) and of supporting 
inconsistencies in the innovation process by giving out mixed signals while at the 
same time satisfying external stakeholders that there is indeed a reasoning be-
hind the response. Figure 4 illustrates our theoretical model of the complexities 
that MNEs face when dealing with disruption.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Our study aims to increase understanding of how large firms respond to tech-
nological disruption. We answer calls (Kor and Leblebici, 2005; Kor and Mesko, 
2013; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009) for a deeper understanding of the complex inter-
dependencies between the firm’s strategic choices about resource development, 
deployment, and investments. As contended by Kor and Mesko (2013, p. 241), ‘it 
is these multilevel asset-strategy interdependencies that are at the hearth of a 
firm’s ability to achieve internal fit, external fit, and evolutionary fit’. Our study 
offers three main contributions to ongoing debates in the technology and strat-
egy literatures.
First, by uncovering the mechanisms through which demand-side heterogene-
ity affects responses to disruption, we complement earlier work on technological 
disruption (Adner, 2002; Adner and Levinthal, 2002; Adner and Snow, 2010a, 
2010b) that emphasized the need to consider market heterogeneity in order to 
understand technological disruption. We also add to later research that suggested 
that focusing one’s strategies on demand-side heterogeneity can lead to superior 
performance (Priem et al., 2012), particularly in the context of two-sided mar-
kets and platform ecosystems (Cennamo et al., 2018; Rietveld and Eggers, 2018). 
Figure 4. Technology disruption, market heterogeneity, and the implications for MNEs
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Specifically, our study reveals that market heterogeneity and conflicting and po-
tentially contradictory customer demands give rise to divergent interpretations of 
the future and of what needs to be done to deal with the new technology. These 
divergent interpretations, in turn, engender inconsistent and potentially contra-
dictory strategies and practices. We identify factors such as allowing multiple stra-
tegic directions, providing structural flexibility, and using inconsistent strategies, 
either concurrently or sequentially, as being important for managing such con-
tradictions effectively during technological disruption in heterogeneous markets. 
These findings resonate with recent developments in the conceptualization of 
strategies for dealing with paradoxes in complex environments and emerging 
ecosystems (Ansari et al., 2016), and they extend prior research that considers 
the importance of customers in incumbents’ responses to technological change 
without incorporating the effects of market heterogeneity (e.g., Gilbert, 2005, 
Lavie, 2006; Taylor and Helfat, 2009).
Second, we contribute to the literature on incumbents’ responses to techno-
logical change by conceptualizing and highlighting the importance of firms’ mis-
alignment capability, namely their ability to allow and manage misalignment in 
order to cope with the complexities of a technological disruption. Prior research 
suggests that the fit between environment and strategy is a critical factor for per-
formance in complex and dynamic market settings (Luo and Park, 2001; Tan and 
Litsschert, 1994) and that this should be supported by internal fit (i.e., the align-
ment between internal aspects of the organization such as strategy, structure, and 
organizational activities) (Peteraf and Reed, 2007). However, our study suggests 
that this is different in heterogeneous markets. When firms respond to disruption 
and consider their fit to contradictory environmental requirements, the value 
of internal fit diminishes and misalignment capability becomes more relevant. 
We identified three specific underlying dimensions for such this capability. One 
dimension of misalignment capability relates to the appreciation and nurturing 
of versatility in strategic direction. Prior research suggests that unified strate-
gic direction (Dess, 1987; Taylor and Helfat, 2009) is of paramount importance 
during strategic change processes. However, our findings suggest that strategic 
unity may work against the ambition to expand the range of options available to 
the firm and to maintain the strategic relationships with key customers. While 
the idea that inconsistency detracts from the internal fit between organizational 
elements (Boumgarden et al., 2012) might lead one to expect an organization 
to adopt internally consistent approaches, our case study indicated that accom-
modating and even nurturing inconsistent visions of future may be unavoidable 
and even vital. The second dimension of misalignment capability has to do with 
resource strategies. Our study suggests that rather than a ‘best fit’ approach (see 
Karim and Capron, 2016; Lavie, 2006), different resource reconfiguration strat-
egies may be needed at various times and in different units of the organization. 
Our case study suggests that organizations dealing with complex environments 
may need to use a combination of redeployment strategies, rather than a single 
contingent-fit approach. The third dimension of misalignment capability relates 
 Embracing Bewilderment: Responding to Disruption 1113
© 2018 The Authors 
Journal of Management Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd and 
Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
to structural mechanisms and organizational redesign. Our case also confirms 
theories that emphasize the importance of a dynamic approach to organizational 
structure (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Kang et al., 2017; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2002), and we conclude that a high level of structural 
dynamicity may be essential to enable an internal learning process to take place 
when a high level of uncertainty and multiple interpretations of the market dy-
namics make it impossible for the firm to reach a unified vision of the future.
Third, we contribute to the international management literature by revealing 
how market heterogeneity affects the processes of renewal in MNEs. Prior re-
search has considered the effect of market heterogeneity on MNE subsidiaries 
(Hoenen and Kostova, 2015; Luo and Park, 2001; Tan and Litsschert, 1994) and 
firm performance in different conditions (Chakrabarti et al., 2011). Our research 
addresses the call for further research (see Teece, 2014) on MNEs’ dynamic ca-
pabilities, and particularly for research which examines the role of market and 
internal heterogeneity in determining those capabilities. Even though research 
on MNE innovation abounds (e.g., Mihalache et al., 2012), our analysis of the 
Ericsson case is one of the first attempts to consider the strategizing and innova-
tion processes used by MNEs when responding to technological disruption. In 
contrast to prior MNE research that suggests that the environment–strategy align-
ment is of paramount importance for achieving competitive advantage (Ghoshal, 
1987; Morrison and Roth, 1992; Schleimer and Pedersen, 2013), our model of 
MNEs’ responses to disruption tries to account for the complexities caused by di-
vergent and sometimes contradictory customer demands. Our findings highlight 
the implications of market heterogeneity for the adaptive responses of MNEs, in 
particular the importance of being able to handle misaligned strategies, struc-
tures, and organizational actions.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Our findings may provide important insights for those managers dealing with 
technological disruption in a heterogeneous market. Managers tend to believe 
that internal alignment is a core capability for enabling effective change. Our 
case study suggests that organizations may need to allow and support inconsistent 
and sometimes contradictory organizational strategies, structures, and activities 
in order to deal with complexity in the external environment. Ashby (1956) sug-
gests that external complexity needs to be matched to internal complexity or, 
in his words, ‘only variety destroys variety’. Our findings show what can happen 
when a firm responds to disruption in a heterogeneous market in ways that are 
complex to handle internally. In this situation, managers may find it beneficial 
to broaden their scope of experimentation and trials to include different and 
sometimes divergent directions. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2015) suggest that 
firms need to overcome the vulnerabilities associated with resource alignment in 
a changing environment. Expanding the range of options and strategic flexibility 
can be achieved by experimentation in different directions. To deal with high 
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levels of complexity and uncertainty managers may benefit from a wider cognitive 
variety – i.e., diverse mental templates for problem-solving, here used to deal with 
coexisting and contradictory interpretations of the market dynamics and corre-
sponding agendas (Eisenhardt et al., 2010).
Accommodating a range of activities within the organization that are based on 
differing interpretations of the market dynamics is obviously costly, and without 
active involvement from senior managers may take organizational resources in 
different directions (Coen and Maritan, 2010). To ensure a successful response 
to disruptive technologies, senior managers need to combine the stressing of 
overarching changes (Smith, 2014) with monitoring, reassessment, and direction 
change when necessary (Eisenhardt et al., 2010). However, such interventions are 
very complex and require senior leaders to handle inconsistent strategies so that 
they can discern when an intervention is necessary to ensure a successful adoption 
of disruptive technologies (Volberda, 1996); interruptions based on inappropri-
ate assumptions may deprive the organization of important learning outcomes.
Failure to distinguish between the assumptions behind different types of exper-
imental activity, and evaluating fundamentally different experiments using com-
mon organizational systems and approaches, may lead to errors of omission and 
a preference for projects that are within the organization’s comfort zone and in 
line with the preferences of their more important customers. Hence, in addition 
to providing slack, delegating authority, and accepting skunk works, it is import-
ant for firms to secure the organizational and managerial capabilities needed 
to deal with the various tensions we have discussed. In particular, firms need a 
variety of approaches to problem-solving and organizational systems that allow 
sufficiently diverse experimentation.
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Our research has its limitations, and it is worth taking a closer look, for exam-
ple, at what makes some MNEs more successful than others at coping with dis-
ruption in a heterogeneous market. Our findings imply that organizations need 
to be both dynamic and flexible, and we therefore need to know how this can 
be achieved. At the micro-level, we found managerial capabilities such as cog-
nitive variety to be quite important in enabling firms to navigate effectively be-
tween contradictory visions of the future and their consequences. Firm-level 
factors such as capacity for learning, governance structure, and incentive systems 
may also play different enabling roles in the complex and challenging process 
of change that we illuminated in this case. While using a single case study was 
appropriate for understanding the nature of these challenges and their conse-
quences, a multiple case study setting or quantitative techniques might enable us 
to identify the drivers of success or failure in the context of MNEs dealing with 
technological disruption in a heterogeneous market. In this paper, we advocated 
the necessity and potential benefits of moving away from attempting to follow an 
aligned strategy for change or trying to ensure that organizational structures and 
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activities are in keeping with such a strategy. Moreover, our findings concerning 
the structural approaches to deal with disruption may also encourage other re-
searchers to choose not to focus on either separation, integration, or vacillation 
(e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2016; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013) but instead to examine 
more closely at how these different approaches might be used concurrently.
This study emphasized demand heterogeneity as a key factor affecting firms’ 
responses to technological disruption. By studying Ericsson’s response to Cloud 
technology, we uncovered the several tensions around the innovation processes 
that arose from demand heterogeneity and we examined the organizational im-
plications of these tensions. A key finding of the study is that, when facing market 
heterogeneity, organizations need to manage internal misalignment rather than 
striving for a single contingent-fit approach. We hope that the insights of this 
study will stimulate further research on global organizations’ responses to tech-
nological disruption.
NOTE
Cloud computing is used to cover a wide range of concepts but there are two 
fundamental underlying technologies: network functions virtualization (NFV) 
and software-defined networking (SDN). These two technologies are mutually 
beneficial but not dependent upon one another.
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APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Cloud technologies adoption speed and magnitudea
1- Please rate your customer concerning the following Cloud-related technologiesb
No activity Some speculations Preliminary plans
Concrete 
plans
Already in 
deployment phase
I don’t 
know
1 2 3 4 5
Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
OSS/BSS modernizations based on Cloud technologies
Providing public and enterprise Cloud offerings (email, chat, media, etc.)
Purchasing Telco-as-a-Service (TaaS) from a vendor
Purchasing organizational/business consultation services from a vendor
Purchasing technical/operational consultation services from a vendor
How do we need to change?
2-  From your perspective, what major improvements Ericsson needs to make in order to fulfil 
the requirements of your customer in the next 3–5 years? [A text box for survey respondents 
to write their answers.]
aThe Cloud technologies categorization is validated by the technology experts.
bCoding schema for the speed of adoption ‘No activities (1)’ and ‘Some speculation (2)’ = ‘Laggards’, 
‘Preliminary plans (3)’ = ‘In-transition’, and ‘Concrete plans (4)’ and ‘Already in deployment phase 
(5)’ = ‘Leads’; Coding schema for the scope of adoption: Operators with more than four technol-
ogy scores of higher than 3.5 = ‘Wide (3)’, operators with more than three technology scores of 2.5 
to 3.5 = ‘Moderate (2)’, others = ‘Narrow (1)’.
